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Abstract—The aim of this paper is to present a market design
for trading capacity reserves (also called Ancillary Services, AS)
and to introduce a strategy for the optimal bidding problem
in such a scenario. In the deregulated market, the presence
of several market participants or Balance Responsible Parties
(BRPs) entitled for trading energy, together with the increasing
integration of renewable sources and price-elastic loads, shift the
focus on decentralized control and reliable forecast techniques.
The main feature of the considered market design is its double-
sided nature. In addition to portfolio-based supply bids and
based on prediction of their stochastic production and load,
BRPs are allowed to submit risk-limiting requests. Requesting
capacity from the AS market corresponds to giving to the market
an estimate of the possible deviation from the daily production
schedule resulting from the day-ahead auction and from bilateral
contracts, named E-Program. In this way each BRP is responsible
for the balanced and safe operation of the electric grid. On the
other hand, at each Program Time Unit (PTU) BRPs must also
offer their available capacity under the form of bids. In this paper,
a bidding strategy to the double-sided market is described, where
the risk is minimized and all the constraints are fulfilled. The
algorithms devised are tested in a simulation environment and
compared to the current practice, where the double-sided auction
is not contemplated. Results in terms of expected imbalances and
reliability are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The profitable management of Balance Responsible Parties
(BRPs), companies allowed to trade energy on the market,
is based on a careful operation planning. Their portfolio
usually consists of a set of generating plants, which can be
fossil-fueled or powered with renewable sources, a set of
internal loads and a group of (price-elastic) prosumers, small
consumers and providers which modify their energy according
to the electricity price.
A BRP has to allocate its output among different channels,
and it can do that in several ways:
• long term bilateral contracts;
• the Day Ahead market, (also called Power Exchange or
PX) that is the spot market for energy, whose result is
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added to the long-term bilateral contracts forming the
bulk daily schedule called E-Program;
• the Intra-Day market, the market for adjustments of the
E-Program;
• the Ancillary Services (AS) market, the market for reserve
capacity.
OTC contracts are nowadays highly exploited in the European
markets [1]. The main motivation is that they bind sure
incomes for BRPs and prevent power consumers with a high
and steady request of power from being negatively exposed
to the volatility of energy prices. However, the constantly
growing focus for real-time optimization in power production
brought the attention of researchers on the Day Ahead and
on the Ancillary Services markets. The more sophisticated
forecast and control techniques should be able to compensate
for the volatility of renewable sources and prices, bringing a
consistent advantage of the real time markets on the static long
term contracts.
The task of submitting bids on the market is not trivial,
as it involves a thorough and careful operation planning. The
different markets are coupled, since if a BRP allocates a certain
amount of power for the spot market, that amount is no longer
available for bidding on the AS market.
Bidding on energy markets involves several sources of
uncertainty, especially when a relevant part of provision is sup-
plied by renewable sources, such as wind or solar cells. Other
important stochastic variables affecting the bidding strategies
are the high volatility of Day Ahead and Ancillary Services
prices, and intermittent and price-elastic load. The presence
of storage units could mitigate the uncertainty deriving from
the use of renewable sources, but not always such systems are
available.
In this paper we describe a novel market architecture de-
signed for the AS bidding auction and we introduce a bidding
strategy that can be used by BRPs to submit offers in this
kind of market. The main characteristic of this market design
is its double-sided nature, that gives to BRPs the possibility of
placing, in addition to bids, also requests for capacity reserves,
providing a confidence interval on the possible deviation
from the contracted program. The main responsibility for
the smooth operation of power systems is therefore shifted
from the centralized TSO (or Transmission System Operator)
to decentralized BRPs. This market structure has been first
introduced in [2].
The goal of this paper is to describe a bidding strategy
applicable to this framework and to present simulation results
showing the validity of the new proposed solutions with
respect to the standard baseline.
The paper is structured as follows. We will first give an
overview of the state of the art in Section II. In Section III we
will then report the proposed market architecture for reserve
capacity. The description of a bidding strategy that can apply
to this framework is given in Section IV. Simulation results
showing the validity of this market structure with respect to
the standard baseline are given in Section V, and conclusions
are drawn in Section VI.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In the deregulated energy market, BRPs must submit profit-
maximizing energy bids and offers for the spot market (PX)
and for the regulating capacity or ancillary services market
(AS). The market design highly influences the bidding strate-
gies. The current Dutch market, which has been taken as the
standard benchmark for our work, besides a set of bilateral
contracts, consists of a Power Exchange, an Intraday market
and an Ancillary Services market, as shown in Figure 1. For
clarity, the Intraday market is neglected in this paper.
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Fig. 1. The energy markets (source: [3])
One day before the delivery generators compose and submit
bids to the Power Exchange (PX). Thereafter the market
clearing price (MCP) and the power volumes are assigned
to each plant. Up to one hour prior to the delivery, BRPs
submit offers for regulating capacity on the ancillary services
market. Generators with installed power higher than 60 MW
are obliged to offer all the power they can increase or decrease
by activating controllable generators. Those bids are sorted in
ascending order as shown in Figure 2 and activated, the most
convenient first, by the TSO to satisfy the real-time need for
regulating capacity. BRPs supplying regulating capacity are
rewarded at the marginal price, so the imbalance price is the
price of the last activated bid. The imbalance price is the price
of the last activated bid. BRPs incurring an imbalance pay
their deviation from the E-Program at this price. An essential
description of the background framework is contained in [4].
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Fig. 3. Bidding Ladder
When there is a need for regulating capacity, the bidding
ladder is used to determine the order in which the capacities
are dispatched. The ‘cheapest’ bids will be dispatched first
until the desired amount of capacity is made available.
If the TSO calls for a specific bid on the imbalance market,
the BRP responsible for this bid is asked to deliver the
requested power Psc. In order to give the BRP an incentive to
deliver Psc, its E-program is offset with the requested power
resulting in the final E-program Efinal[n]
Efinal[n] = Eprog[n] +
￿
PTU
Psc[k] (7)
= Eprog[n] + Esc[n]. (8)
Note that (7) even holds when the TSO does not request for
secondary power, i.e. Psc[k] = 0 resulting in Efinal[n] =
Eprog[n].
D. Imbalance Price
The imbalance price λimb [e/MWh] is the price related to
imbalance in the system due to a deviation from the E-program
∆Eprog[n] defined as
∆Eprog[n] = Efinal[n]− Egen[n], (9)
where Egen[n] represents the total amount of generated elec-
trical energy on top of the internal load PL of the BRP. Hence
Egen[n] is defined as
Egen[n] =
￿
PTU
(PG[k]− PL[k]), (10)
with PG the total generated power within the BRP as the sum
of all generator outputs.
When the BRP has an energy surplus (∆Eprog > 0), the
TSO buys this surplus energy at λimb. Vice versa, when the
BRP has an energy shortage (∆Eprog < 0), the BRP buys
the lacking energy from the TSO at λimb. Whether or not
this transaction costs money for the BRP depends solely on
the difference between λimb and the actual cost λprod for
producing ∆Eprog. E.g. when ∆Eprog > 0 the BRP receives
λimb from the TSO and pays λprod to generate the excess
energy. Hence the BRP has a net profit of λimb − λprod. In
case of ∆Eprog < 0 the BRP pays λimb for the lacking energy
and saves λprod for not producing the same amount of energy.
Hence the BRP has a net profit of λprod−λimb. So depending
on the direction of the E-program deviation and the actual λimb
the BRP either earns or loses money. λimb is determined by
the dispatch price, control state and price incentive[5], [7], [8].
1) Dispatch Price: When the TSO requests reserve capacity
it will call for the cheapest bids on the bidding ladder. At the
end of the PTU, the dispatch price (DP) is determined by the
most expensive bid requested. In Fig. 3 this is illustrated for
both positive and negative reserve capacity requests. Here the
shaded bids are requested and the most expensive bid in each
direction determines the positive DP, λpos, and negative DP,
λneg, in [e/MWh]. If during a PTU, the TSO does not request
any reserve capacity at all, DP is chosen to be equal to the
average of the cheapest positive and cheapest negative bid.
This is defined as the middle price, λmid.
2) Control State: The control state (CS) is an indication
of the direction of the imbalance of the overall system[9].
The CS is based on all calls on the imbalance market during
one PTU, and can take four different values: 0, -1, +1 and
2. If the system was well balanced during the whole PTU,
the TSO neither calls for positive or negative reserve power.
As a result CS equals 0. If only positive reserve capacity is
requested during a PTU CS = +1, i.e. the system has a power
shortage. If only negative capacity is requested CS = −1, i.e.
the system has a power surplus. In the situation that the TSO
had to call for both positive and negative capacity during a
single PTU, CS is a little more complicated[9]. For simplicity
assume CS = 2 in such situation.
3) Price Incentive: To give the BRPs an extra incentive to
keep to their respective E-programs a price incentive λin is
included in the total λimb. Based on the performance of the
system, the TSO alters λimb according to specific rules. Since
the introduction of λin in 2001, its value has decreased to zero
with only a few exceptions. λin is therefore neglected in the
remainder of this paper. It is only represented in this section
for a complete understanding of the construction of λimb.
With the above parameters defined, λimb is calculated as
shown in Table I. Remember that ∆Eprog < 0 implies that
the BRP pays the TSO for extra energy and vice versa. e.g.
TABLE I
PRICE COMPOSITION OF THE IMBALANCE PRICE λimb
Control State ∆Eprog > 0 ∆Eprog < 0
0 λmid − λin λmid + λin
-1 λneg − λin λneg + λin
+1 λpos − λin λpos + λin
2 λneg − λin λpos + λin
assume CS = +1 and that a certain BRP has fallen short to
its E-program (∆Eprog < 0). The BRP has to buy the missing
energy from the TSO at the price the TSO itself paid at the
imbalance market in order to restore the system balance. Hence
the BRP has to pay λpos+λin. Because the imbalance market
is a free market, the bids are assumed to be made at marginal
cost. Therefor the following relation holds:
λpos > λprod > λneg, (11)
Fig. 2. The bidladder for ancillary services
Generally speaking, power plants that are deemed price-
takers end to bi at the marginal cost. In fact, since the
behavior of these plants is not supposed to influence the final
market outcome, they just accept the cleared price as a result,
under the condition that this price is higher of the marginal
production cost, and therefore some profit is guaranteed. On
the other hand, big power producers which are capable to
influence the price for electricity have their private bidding
strategies which cannot be revealed.
The bidding activity is crucial for the BRP’s economic
equilibrium, and involves the analysis of several sources of
uncertainty. First, energy prices are highly volatile and can
range from a few euros per MWh up to 1000 e. Price forecast
occupy a central role, since a bad bidding strategy can lead
to severe losses. Stochastic models of electricity prices, which
are affected by high volatility and jumps, are presented in [5]
and [6]. The latter considers the dynamical evolution of
volatility and introduces parameter-varying models such as
GARCH models. Second, the generator has its own load to
satisfy, which is usually stochastic (see [7] for a possible
approach to short-term load forecasts) as well as the available
amount of renewable sources, over which only (more or less
reliable) predictions can be given. Third, as the Day-ahead
and the Ancillary Services markets mutually affect each other
and the production is finite, a BRP has to decide where
to allocate its capacity in order to optimize an economic
objective which can be the pure expected profit or a risk-
based signal. The coupling between Day-ahead and Ancillary
Services markets r presents one of the major limi ations in this
context. In m ny market arrangements, the plant has to set two
independent bids at the same time, without knowing neither
the Day-ahead price, nor the Ancillary services price, which
on the other hand are strictly correlated. This may lead to
global solutions that are far from the optimum, and the social
welfare might be penalized. To overcome this limitations,
we consider a market arrangement where Day-Ahead and
Ancillary Services markets are executed in two subsequent
sessions. A contribution to the market design considered in
this work in which coupling between prices is avoided is
contained in [8], where potential benefits and downsides of
such a market structure are illustrated. The market design
strategies proposed in the cited work include the execution
of iterated spot and ancillary services auctions, thus implying
multiple sequential bidding sessions to ensure convergence.
A kind of decoupled bidding strategy is implemented on real
systems in the Australian Energy Market [9]. Here, generators
offers to the AS market are incremental price functions of the
available reserve capacity, depending on the energy dispatched
at the PX level. In the remainder, we can hence neglect the
coupling between prices, since the outcome of the clearing
process is known when the Ancillary Services bids are sent to
the TSO.
III. THE E-PRICE ELECTRICITY MARKET
In this section we describe the market design which is the
background of our work.
The day-ahead or Power Exchange (PX) auction in this work
keeps the main features of the standard electricity market.
BRPs submit their bids and offers and the APX1 operates
the clearing of the market, whose output is an approximate
schedule of the power production of the next day. From the
day-ahead clearing process one can either result as a requestor
or a supplier, and the corresponding income/outcome in one
day is:
IPX =
24∑
h=1
EPX(h)λPX(h) (1)
Where λPX is always positive and EPX(h) is the energy
delivered in hour h. Delivering/producing energy yields a
profit and receiving/consuming costs, so a negative profit. To
this value one must add the incomes from bilateral contracts
and internal contracted loads, whose price is calculated on
the basis of λEX . The main innovation is the double-sided
concept for the ancillary services market, which is described
in the next subsection.
A. The Ancillary Services market
In the framework envisioned in this work, Ancillary Ser-
vices provision can be either passive (request R) or active
(supply S). The request R indicates all the energy a BRP
wants to buy and can be bidirectional. It implies a negative
cash flow, which means that the BRP is paying an amount of
money. In particular:
• R+ implies positive request (BRP expects to be “long”
and hence is willing to pay for additional absorption),
• R− implies negative request (BRP expects to be “short”
and hence is willing to pay for additional injection).
On the contrary, the supply S indicates the surplus/deficit a
BRP wants to sell, so that it wants to be paid for. It implies a
positive cash flow, which means that the BRP is receiving an
amount of money. In particular:
• S+ means positive supply (BRP is willing to be paid for
producing more energy),
1APX-ENDEX is an European energy exchange, operating spot and futures
markets for electricity and natural gas in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and Belgium.
!
"#"#" $%&'&()%!*+,-&,(.'%+!&-!.!/01!
!"#$%&'()#$*+%,$&*-+.,/',$01$2+.$/$340$&%$&,%$'#,$-.+2&,$+2$+-#./,&'($&'$,"#$-+5#.$%6%,#*7$36$8+*-/.&'($&,%$'#,$
.#9#':#$:';#.$;&22#.#',$&',#.'/)$%,./,#(&#%$5"&8"$.#%-#8,$,+$-/.,&8&-/,&'($&'$<=>$&'$&*?/)/'8#$/';$&',#./8,&'($
5&,"$&,%$-.+%:*#.%$/';$#@,#.'/)$8&.8:*%,/'8#%>$,"#$?#'#2&,%$+2$%:8"$/$%,./,#(6$8/'$?#8+*#$9&%&?)#$2+.$,"#$340%7$
!"&%$01$8/'$?#$:%#;$2+.$8+*-/.&'($/*+'($;&22#.#',$%,./,#(&#%$/';$;&22#.#',$%8#'/.&+%7$
<$340$.#8#&9#%$+.$-/6%$/,$,"#$AB>$<=C>$<=D$*/.E#,%>$.#8#&9#%$+.$-/6%$2+.$&,%$%:--)&#;$+.$8+'%:*#;$/:@&)&/.6$
%#.9&8#%$<=>$.#8#&9#%$+.$-/6%$2+.$&,%$&*?/)/'8#$.#8#&9#%$+.$-/6%$2+.$&,%$F!G$,./;#$/';$.#8#&9#%$2.+*$&,%$%:--+.,#;$
)+/;%7$$
!"#$<GA$&%$;#2&'#;$/%$<GA$H$I0D0.#2J$C$KLI2DMNJ7$
$
=#-/./,#$#)#*#',%$+2$,"#$'#,$-.+2&,$+2$/$340$5&))$?#$;#%8.&?#;O$
$
$23(.,4+5!
P+):*#%$/';$-.&8#%$/.#$E'+5'7$<%$5#$,.6$,+$;#%8.&?#$-.+2&,%$&,$*#/'%$,"/,$;#)&9#.&'(Q-.+;:8&'($#'#.(6$6&#);%$/$
-.+2&,$/';$.#8#&9&'(Q8+'%:*&'($8+%,%>$%+$/$'#(/,&9#$-.+2&,7$!"#$-.+2&,%Q8+%,%$8/'$?#$/;;#;$2+.$#/8"$0!R>$?/%#;$
+'$,"#$+:,8+*#$+2$,"#$AB7$=+$2+.$340&$,"#$.#%:),$+2$,./;&'($/,$,"#$AB$6&#);%$-.+2&,%$I#'#.(6$8/'$?#$-+%&,&9#$+.$
'#(/,&9#>$-.&8#$&%$/)5/6%$-+%&,&9#JO$ !!"!! ! !!"!!!"!!! !!! ! !!"!!!$
!"#$9/):#%$A$/.#$#@-#8,#;$,+$?#$;#%8.&?#;$/%$#'#.(6$S1T"U$&'$/$0!R7$V2$,"#$9+):*#$&%$;#2&'#;$/%$-+5#.$0$
S1TU>$,"#$#'#.(6$+2$,"/,$-+5#.$&'$/$0!R$"/%$,+$?#$:%#;O$AH!L0>$5&,"$!$,"#$)#'(,"$&'$"+:.%$+2$/$0!R7$
$
67!(.,4+58!
T"#'$,"#$<=$*/.E#,%$/.#$8)#/.#;>$2+.$#/8"$340&$&,%$8)#/.#;$9+):*#%$2+.$%:--)6&'($I=J$+.$.#W:#%,&'($$I4J$S1T"U$
/.#$;#,#.*&'#;>$?+,"$2+.$,"#$:-D.#(:)/,&'($*/.E#,$<=C$I;#),/0XN$5&,"$=C&$/';$4
C
&
$$/';$-.&8#$Y<=CJ$/';$,"#$;+5'$
.#(:)/,&'($*/.E#,$I;#),/0ZN$5&,"$=D&$/';$4
D
$&$/';$-.&8#$Y<=DJ7$T#$5&))$:%#$,"#$2+))+5&'($'+,/,&+'$2+.$,"#$%&('%$+2$
,"#$8)#/.#;$9+):*#%$/';$-.&8#%$/%$&)):%,./,#;$&'$2&(:.#$@7$!"#$9/):#%$+2$4C>$=D$/';$Y<=D$/.#$'#(/,&9#7$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
!"#$%&'()'*+,$-&.'/01'2%"3&.'3,&/%&1'/4'45&'67'-/%8&4.)'$22&%'2/%4'$29%&#$,/4"0#:',/4&%'2/%4'1+;09%&#$,/4"0#<'
$
<$340$8/'$-/.,&8&-/,#$/,$?+,"$,"#$<=D$/';$,"#$<=C$*/.E#,7$3#&'($%:--)&#.$+2$<=$/$.#5/.;$&%$.#8#&9#;$
-.+-+.,&+'/)$5&,"$,"#$8)#/.#;$9+):*#$/';$,"#$8)#/.#;$-.&8#$&'$0!R$-7$3#&'($.#W:#%,+.>$/$2##$"/%$,+$?#$-/&;7$=+>$
,./;&'($/,$,"#$<=$*/.E#,%$8/'$6&#);$/$-+%&,&9#$I2+.$=J$+.$'#(/,&9#$-.+2&,$I2+.$4JO$!!"#!! ! ! ! !!"!!!!"!!! ! ! !!"! ! ! ! ! !!"!!!
!"
!!! !!! ! !!"!!!!$
!"#$9/):#$A<=>&$#@-.#%%#%$#'#.(6$S1T"U7$!"#$8+#22&8&#',$/$&%$/$*/.E#,$;#%&('$-/./*#,#.7$G"++%&'($&,$,++$%*/))$
5&))$.#;:8#$%:--)6&'($340%$2+.$<=>$8"++%&'($&,$,++$)/.(#$5&))$.#;:8#$.#W:#%,&'($340%$2+.$<=>$%+$/'$+-,&*/)$9/):#$
+2$/$#@&%,%$5"&8"$6&#);%$,"#$)/.(#%,$)&W:&;&,6$&'$,"#$8)#/.#;$9+):*#%7$
1+.#+9#.>$/$340$,"/,$&%$/$%:--)&#.$+2$<=$5&))$.#8#&9#$/$?#'#2&,$5"#'$,"#$!=F$8/))%$&,$2+.$%:--)6&'($<=$&'$/$0!R7$
!"#$/*+:',$+2$<=$#'#.(6$&'$/$0!R$8/'$?#$8/)8:)/,#;$/%$I5&,"$[$%#8+';$8/)8:)/,&+'$&',#.9/)JO$
$
0.&8#$Y<=C$
SAQ1T"U$
0.&8#$Y<=D$
SAQ1T"U$
S1T"U$N$
=C$
4D$
4C$
=D$
\+5'D.#(:)/,&'($*/.E#,$
R-D.#(:)/,&'($*/.E#,$
Fig. 3. Volumes and prices cleared at the AS market: upper part up-regulating,
lower part down-regulating
• S− means negative supply (BRP is willing to be paid for
decreasing its production).
Bids for the AS market refer to Program Time Unit (PTU)
of 15 minutes and can be sent up to one hour prior to the
delivery. Let us define the following prices (in e/MWh):
• λPX is the Day-Ahead price,
• λAS+ is the price for injecting energy (upward direction),
• λAS− is the price for sourcing energy (downward direc-
tion),
• λimb is the cost for causing an imbalance (upward or
downward, not relevant at the moment).
Note that λAS+ ≥ 0, λAS− ≤ 0 and always λimb ≥ 0. A
BRP can participate in both the AS- and AS+ markets. When
the AS markets are cleared, the prices λAS+(k) and λAS−(k)
are determined, as well as the the net position of each BRP
EAS+(k) and EAS(k). Therefore, from this process a BRP
can either result as a supplier or a requestor. Payments for the
only allocation of AS are proportional to the AS price λAS .
Trading on the AS markets can therefore lead to a positive
profit (S) or to a cost (R):
ICA =
NPTU∑
k=1
aEAS+(k)λAS+(k)+
NPTU∑
k=1
aEAS−(k)λAS−(k)
(2)
Where a is a design parameter of the market. In other
words, the term a might be seen as the cost for participating
to the double-sided market. For example, if a BRP results as
a requestor of positive energy for PTU k, its cleared capacity
EAS+i (k) is negative and it has to pay aE
AS+
i (k)λ
AS+ to
reserve the quantity EAS+i for regulating purposes. We use
the notation for the signs of the cleared volumes and prices
as shown in Figure 3.
In real time operations, the TSO sends in each TP seconds
(in the simulation framework, TP = 4) a request signal called
∆P to BRPs, which is the request for varying the power output
of controllable generators. If the need for upward regulating
energy occurs, the TSO sends in positive ∆P , on the contrary,
if too much energy is present on the grid, the TSO transmits
negative ∆P . The signal ∆P is distributed among BRPs based
on their cleared capacity. The profit obtained by the supply of
regulating power on the AS in PTU k is defined as follows:
IAS(k) =
N∑
t=1
(w∆P (t)λAS+(t)+(1−w)∆P (t)λAS−(t)) TP
3600
(3)
where
w =
{
1 if ∆P (t) ≥ 0,
0 if ∆P (t) < 0 (4)
where N is the number of TP periods in a PTU. Note that
IAS always denotes a profit, as the signs of ∆P and λAS are
always concordant.
B. The imbalance system
Any deviation from the scheduled E-Program is considered
as imbalance (see [4]). Imbalances are settled by the TSO by
means of a process called imbalance settlement.
For each PTU the imbalance price λimb is calculated, on
the basis of λAS+ and λAS− and of the control state. This
parameter indicates the direction of the system imbalance and
can take the values +1,−1, 0 or 2, as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
THE CONTROL STATE
∆P CS
always < 0 −1
always = 0 0
always > 0 1
sometimes < 0, sometimes > 0 2
A BRP is in imbalance when its control error ECE =∫ T
t=0
Pref (t) − P (t) deviates from 0, where Pref (t) is the
power reference set-point deriving from the E-Program and
AGC signal and P (t) is the actual power output. Depending
on ECE and on the cleared volumes of AS of BRP i, the
imbalance costs/profits can be calculated. The imbalance price
applied to positive deviations from the E-Program is calculated
as λimb,+ = φλAS+, where φ = 1+a+0.1. The proportional
factor must force the imbalance price to be higher than the
AS price. Similarly, negative deviations from E-Program are
penalized at the price λimb,− = φλAS−. If a BRP has
previously bought reserve capacity on the AS market, then as
far as its deviation is within the cleared capacity the applied
imbalance price is λAS+ or λAS− (depending on the direction
of the deviation). In case the imbalance exceeds the allocated
capacity, the excess deviation is paid at λimb.
In some market architectures passive balancing (i.e. deliber-
ately causing imbalances which help the system) is rewarded,
that is, even if the BRP is in imbalance it receives a payment if
its deviation helps the system recover the normal conditions. In
this work, passive balancing is neither rewarded nor penalized.
Therefore, BRPs only aim at minimizing their own imbalances
in real time. Nevertheless, passive balancing is applicable to
our algorithms. In this case BRPs optimize in real time a given
cost function and can intentionally go out of balance if that
is profitable, that is, when the direction of their imbalance
is opposite with respect to the system imbalance. A two-
scale stochastic algorithm applying passive balancing has been
devised, implemented and tested at BRP level in the E-Price
framework and it is described in [10]. A possible approach
to the design and implications of different passive balancing
policies at system level are tackled in [11].
IV. THE DAY-AHEAD BIDDING STRATEGIES
BRPs can be thought as aggregated companies produc-
ing and consuming energy and satisfying a certain amount
of internal loads. The main goal of such companies is to
maximize their own profit, while limiting the incurred risks.
The concept of the project underlying this paper is to devise
efficient algorithms, market architectures and ICT interfaces
in order to shift the main responsibility for the reliability of
the energy system from the centralized TSO to BRPs, and to
economically incentivize them to guarantee the correct and
safe operation on the grid. Each BRP aims at maximizing its
own profit given by:
λBCxBC+λDAxDA+λASxAS−λimbximb−(c2p2+c1p+c0)
(5)
where:
• λBCxBC is the revenue from bilateral contracts,
• λDAxDA is the revenue from the day-ahead market,
• λASxAS is the revenue from the trade on ancillary
services markets,
• λimbximb is the imbalance cost,
• the last term in brackets represents production costs,
which is a quadratic function of power p.
By day-ahead strategies we mean the decision making process
tackled by the BRP before delivering its produced energy. It
includes the following tasks:
1) Bidding on the day-ahead market,
2) Scheduling a first indicative production profile by cal-
culating the unit commitment schedule,
3) Bidding on the ancillary services market.
When submitting the day-ahead bid curve, BRPs must take
into account the uncertainty deriving from AS prices (not
yet disclosed), renewable production and loads. Since energy
cannot be stored, the two markets are coupled, because what
is sold at the day-ahead is no more available for trading on
the AS market.
For this reason the bidding algorithm has been structured
as a two-stage process, where in the first stage the day-ahead
bidding curves are calculated, solving a scenario-based opti-
mization problem for each hour of the following day, where
a risk function based on (5) is minimized. More specifically,
the algorithm aims at minimizing the Conditional Value at
Risk (CVaR), a function used to indicate the expected losses
trespassing a certain threshold (Value at Risk). Estimation of
CVaR requires the definition of a loss function, which we have
chosen as the negated profit. Hence in this case minimization
of risk approaches to some extent the worst case minimization.
The problem of deciding both the energy volume to offer
on the market and the corresponding price is clearly bilinear2.
In order to keep the problem linear, prices are fixed to some
user-defined values and energy volumes are computed such
that they are optimal for the chosen prices (a similar approach
has been taken, e.g., in [12]). Let λPX1 , λ
PX
2 , . . . , λ
PX
N be the
sequence of fixed PX prices. For each λPXi , 2L scenarios
of possible prices for the Ancillary Services Market λASi ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , 2L are generated, which constitute the second
stage of the optimization problem. Then, the problem is solved
for each of the generated prices λPXi , obtaining the energy
volumes EPXi to offer on the market, with i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N .
Finally, the piecewise constant bid curve is constructed by
interpolation as
λ(E) =

λ1 if E1 ≤ E < E2,
λ2 if E2 ≤ E < E3,
...
...
λN−1 if EN−1 ≤ E < EN ,
λN if E = EN .
(6)
In order to solve the problem for the PX we assume a price
taker point of view, that is, the considered BRP’s offers do
not influence the market significantly and the BRP accepts any
couple (energy, price) decided by the market on the proposed
bidding curve. Generating costs are approximated with an
affine curve of the produced power. Stochastic scenarios of
the optimization problem at this stage model the AS prices
and their corresponding probability. Ancillary Services prices
are generated based on historical data relating control energy
prices (as differential to the Day-Ahead Market price) with the
system imbalance, provided by TenneT3. This relation, shown
in Figure 4, is market driven and appears quite stable and
robust over the years, hence being suitable to be used for
modeling purposes. The left side of the graph is related to
the case where the market is short, BRPs sell Energy to the
TSO, and the ASM price is higher than the DAM price. Bids
Fig. 4. Relation between day-ahead and ancillary services prices
are portfolio-based, that is, they are calculated based on the
generating costs of the plants and their risk attitude. BRP risk
2A function is bilinear when it is linear in each of its variables. The simplest
example is f(x, y) = xy.
3TenneT is the Dutch TSO, and also a partner in the E-Price project
attitudes are classified as small, medium or high, depending on
the percentage of uncertainty a BRP wants to hedge against.
After the clearing process, the E-Program is sent to each
BRP. This is the basis for calculating the unit commitment
algorithm, whose output is a 24 hour on/off schedule and
average production profile for the following day.
Based on the E-Program and UC, up to one hour prior to
delivery BRPs are free to submit offer and request curves for
their residual capacity to the AS market. The same approach
of the day-ahead bidding is used: a set of prices is fixed
and optimal volumes to sell and buy are calculated for each
of them, optimizing a stochastic function based on risk.
Stochastic scenarios model the uncertain production that can
be observed at the time of the delivery. Wind production and
load are aggregated into one single “prosumption” stochastic
variable (load is considered as negative stochastic production).
Stochastic information on drift rate and standard deviation
of the one-hour ahead error of wind and load are extracted
from historical data. The approach used with respect to wind
power is the so called persistence approach, meaning that
the expected value of the wind production for the time of
deployment is the one-hour ahead observation.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The aim of this section is to show the performance of
the bidding techniques proposed in this paper in the single-
sided and double-sided market architectures and with respect
to the reference system. Data about AS realized prices, forecast
and realized wind production and loads are provided by the
Dutch TSO TenneT and by KEMA. Specifically, 4 data sets
have been given, each differing in terms of wind forecast and
size. Wind forecast can be perfect (in case the day-ahead
forecast matches the realized wind production) or imperfect
(the realistic situation accounting for some prediction error).
The second difference stands in the size of the renewable
production, which can be in line with the current standard or
with the expected future production of 2030. The last aspect
is considered to test the capability of BRPs for coping with
the relevant wind increment expected in the future years.
The proposed day-ahead strategy has been tested in a
simulation environment reproducing a national power system.
The environment includes 7 BRPs with different production
portfolios and risk attitudes, a TSO and a set of small power
consumers/providers with elastic demand.
Plants consist of Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT)
and wind farms. The simulated period is a time span of one
day consisting of 96 PTUs with a length of 15 minutes.
The double-sided architecture has been compared to the
actual single-sided structure for reserve markets, where no
request can be submitted and imbalances are fully solved on
the market based on a bid ladder (most convenient bids are
activated first) as shown in Section II.
The effect of wind uncertainty and production has been
tested by providing 4 data sets, each with different settings
of wind forecast (perfect/imperfect) and production size (cur-
rent/future). The parameter a in (2) is set at a = 0.05,
consequently the imbalance penalty is fixed at φ = 1.15. In the
simulated case studies the imperfect wind forecast condition
relates to a situation where more wind than forecast is present
in the system.
In each setting the double-sided architecture shows better
performance with respect to profit and imbalance costs. By
construction, AS prices are higher in the double-sided market
and this encourages BRPs to allocate resources in a more
efficient way. BRPs providing regulating capacity are rewarded
more, thus increasing the overall benefit. To give an idea of the
regulating capacity actually activated in real time, let us look
at Figure 5, related to current wind production and imperfect
forecast.
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Fig. 5. AGC signal and allocated upward/downward capacity with current
wind production and imperfect forecast
The red line is the aggregated signal (AGC signal) sent by
the TSO to BRPs for regulating power. The trend of the signal
is basically the same in the two settings, but in the double-
sided case (Figure 5(b)) it is for most part included between
the two green lines delimiting the cleared AS capacity. As far
as the signal keeps between the two green lines, the system is
prepared to react by delivering the previously allocated power.
In case there is no sufficient cleared AS capacity, the TSO must
resort to un-cleared bids. If not even this capacity suffices, the
TSO must ask the help of neighboring countries. Also the price
development is interesting in these two case studies, shown in
Figure 6.
It can be noted in Figure 6(b) that double-sided prices are
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Fig. 6. ASPrice development with current wind production and imperfect
forecast
constant over the PTU, they show a more regular trend and
are in general higher with respect to the single-sided case
(especially in the upward direction). This confirms that by
construction, the double-sided market ensures more liquidity
to the AS trade.
In perfect forecast conditions the AGC signal is as depicted
in Figure 7. As expected, in the interval [1 ∗ 104, 3 ∗ 104]
seconds the AGC signal observed in Figure 7(a)-(b) is more
balanced than in Figure 5, more specifically there is no need
for the high downward capacity activated in imperfect forecast
conditions. It can also be noted that in this situation, the
cleared downward capacity is lower than the upward volume.
This directly comes from the affine cost structure utilized in
the optimization: due to the linearity of the cost function,
decreasing the power output always leads to cost savings, as a
consequence it is always preferable to balance any excess of
power internally instead of resorting to the market. This means
that downward request values tend to be small and in general
limited to the cases when the risk of downward imbalance
is threatening, which is more likely in imperfect forecast
conditions. Price development in case of perfect forecast is
reported in Figure 8.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a market architecture for ancillary services
provision has been presented and a bidding strategy that can
apply to this market has been introduced. First, some overview
on the state of the art and on the current benchmark we are
aiming to improve on have been given. We have described the
most important operations a BRP tackles from one the day up
to one hour prior to the delivery, when the power production
and allocation must be planned. These are delicate and risky
tasks, because energy prices are extremely volatile and subject
to fluctuations which are hard to absorb in the absence of
energy storage devices in the grid. Moreover, the coupling
between markets requires an even more attentive operation
planning, since the energy sold on the Day-Ahead market
cannot be used for other purposes.
The proposed solution is thoroughly designed to tackle the
risk borne by BRPs and to support them in the decision making
process. A scenario-based algorithm is devised where a linear
stochastic problem is solved at every time unit (hour or PTU),
to build the piecewise constant bid curve. A risk measure
is minimized, in a way that reduces the risk of the BRP
incurring great losses. Operating constraints such as minimum
and maximum power setpoints, ramp rate limits and internal
balancing are satisfied.
One of the most important features of the new market
(a) Single-sided marlet
(b) Double-sided market
Fig. 8. ASPrice development with current wind production and perfect
forecast
architecture is the introduction of AS requests quantities.
These confidence intervals allow the system to be prepared
to possible deviations in the prosumption by BRPs and react
promptly.
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